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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the making of UK monetary policy between 1997 and 2008 by analysing 
voting behaviour in the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).  We provide 
a new set of measures for the monetary policy preferences of individual MPC members by 
estimating a Bayesian item response model.  We demonstrate the usefulness of these 
measures by comparing the ideal points of outgoing MPC members with their successors and 
by looking at changes over time in the median ideal point on the MPC.  Our analysis indicates 
that the British government has been able to move the position of the median voter on the 
MPC through its appointments to the committee. This highlights the importance of central 
bank appointments for monetary policy.  
 
 
Keywords: monetary policy, central banks, ideal point estimation. 
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On 11 January 2007 the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England 
increased the interest rate by one-quarter per cent to 5.25 per cent.  The increase came as a 
surprise to most observers given the economic conditions and past behaviour of the MPC.  
When the minutes of the meeting were published three weeks later, they revealed that the 
committee had split 5 to 4 in favour of the increase.  In fact, the MPC has been divided about 
two-thirds of the time since the Bank of England was made independent in 1997, although 
rarely split down the middle as in January 2007.  Presented with the same information about 
the state of the British economy each month, why do the members of the MPC disagree on the 
appropriate interest rate?  Clearly, British central bankers, like all policymakers, do not all 
think the same way.  This suggests that had the composition of the MPC been slightly 
different in January 2007, the decision might have been to hold rates rather than to increase 
them. 
We offer a spatial analysis of voting in the MPC from the first meeting of the 
committee after the Bank of England was made independent in June 1997 until April 2008.  
We use Bayesian simulation methods, introduced by Martin and Quinn (2002) and Clinton et 
al. (2004) in the context of courts and legislatures respectively, to estimate an item response 
model that measures the monetary policy preferences of all of the 25 individuals who have 
been members of the MPC during this ten-year period.  We measure these preferences along 
an underlying dimension that we label a dove-hawk dimension, where ‘hawks’ tend to prefer 
higher interest rates than ‘doves’ when faced with identical economic conditions.  Our 
estimates control for varying economic conditions across MPC meetings and incorporate 
information as to the substantive direction of the interest rate proposals voted on by MPC 
members.  Furthermore, the Bayesian estimation method we employ ensures that our 
preference measures are accompanied by statistically valid uncertainty estimates and also 
makes it straightforward to draw inferences regarding auxiliary parameters of substantive 
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interest.  We demonstrate the value of these features by using our measures to investigate 
patterns in the monetary policy preferences of individuals appointed to the MPC, and in the 
median ideal point on the MPC over time.  Our analysis indicates that the observed pattern in 
MPC appointments is not consistent with a simple political business cycle in central bank 
appointments.  Nevertheless, through its appointment powers, the British government has 
been able to move the position of the MPC over time.  This suggests that central bank 
appointments matter for monetary policy.  In light of this, we discuss possible alternative 
incentives that might have motivated the British government’s appointment choices. 
In the next section we provide a brief review of the existing literature on monetary 
policy making on the MPC and on central banks more generally.  In the third section we 
develop the statistical model we employ to measure monetary policy preferences, and 
describe our data and estimation method.  We present the resulting measures in the fourth 
section.  Finally, in the fifth section we apply our measures to investigate whether there is an 
intelligible pattern in the composition of the MPC over time. 
 
Studying the Bank of England MPC 
One of the first acts of the newly elected British Labour government in May 1997 was to 
grant operational independence for setting monetary policy to the Bank of England.  After 
almost two decades in opposition, the new Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, was eager to demonstrate his party’s commitment to economic stability.  Economists 
have argued that central bank independence with a clear and simple mandate is an effective 
institutional arrangement for delivering low and stable inflation (Rogoff 1985).  The logic is 
that removing representative government from direct involvement in monetary policy making 
and placing responsibility in the hands of a relatively inflation-averse central bank mitigates 
the ‘time-inconsistency problem’, where suboptimal inflation levels arise because a policy-
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maker cannot credibly commit not to induce surprise inflation (Kydland & Prescott 1977; 
Barro & Gordon 1983).  Granting independence to the Bank of England hence sent a strong 
signal to financial markets and the electorate that Labour could be trusted to manage the 
British economy. 
The act of Parliament that established central bank independence in the UK provided 
for the Chancellor to set an inflation target and for a Monetary Policy Committee to set 
monetary policy instruments at monthly meetings with the aim of achieving this target.  The 
inflation target is currently set at 2 per cent on the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  If this target 
is missed by more than one percentage point on either side, the Governor of the Bank has to 
write a letter to the Chancellor explaining why the target has been missed.  This implies that 
the inflation target is symmetric (below-target inflation is not deemed to be more desirable 
than above-target inflation) and that a range of inflation rates around the target are politically 
acceptable.  The key monetary policy instrument set by the MPC is the official Bank Rate; 
this is the interest rate at which the Bank of England supplies funds to the banking system for 
a two-week period. 
The MPC consists of nine members who decide on the Bank Rate by majority vote at 
each monthly meeting.  The decision-making process on the MPC has been described by 
Bank of England employees Bean and Jenkinson (2001: 435-437) as follows.  First, 
committee members are presented with the latest economic information by Bank staff at a 
monthly briefing.  Second, members discuss economic conditions on the first of a two-day 
policy meeting the following week.  Third, on the second morning of the policy meeting, the 
Governor invites each member in turn to summarise his or her views regarding the 
appropriate monetary policy (usually including his or her preferred interest rate).  Members 
are called in a random order, with the Deputy Governor responsible for Monetary Policy 
speaking first and the Governor concluding.  Finally, the Governor proposes an interest rate 
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‘that he expects will command a majority’ (p.438) and members vote on this proposal.  The 
governor votes last. The preferred interest rate of a member who votes against the winning 
proposal is recorded. 
Of the nine individuals who sit on the MPC at any one time, five ‘internal’ members 
are appointed as staff of the Bank of England and four ‘external’ members are appointed by 
the Chancellor.  Of the internal members, the Governor and the two Deputy Governors of the 
MPC are appointed for renewable five-year terms by the Crown, which effectively means the 
Chancellor.  The two other internal members, the Executive Directors of the Bank, are 
appointed for renewable three-year terms by the Governor of the Bank of England, after 
consultation with the Chancellor.  The four external members are appointed for renewable 
three-year terms.  Nominees are required to go before the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee, which can take a vote of approval, but does not have the power to veto a 
Chancellor’s appointment choice.3  Thus the government, and particularly the Chancellor, 
would appear to possess a great deal of control over the appointment of most MPC members.   
Table 1 lists the details of the twenty-five individuals who were members of the MPC 
at one time or another between June 1997 and April 2008.  As the table shows, there is 
variance in the career background of both internal and external members prior to their 
appointment.  A plurality of the eleven internal appointees had a background within the Bank 
of England, but six came from other backgrounds such as financial institutions, academia and 
the civil service.  Similarly, a plurality of the externally appointed members had a background 
in academia, but others come from financial institutions in the City of London, the civil 
service, or industry. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
                                                     
3
 In fact, in May 2000 the Treasury Select Committee voted to reject Christopher Allsopp as the replacement of 
Charles Goodhart, but the Chancellor ignored the position of the committee. 
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Turning to existing research on the MPC, several scholars have estimated reaction 
functions of varying specifications to assess the response of MPC interest rates to key 
economic variables (cf. Gascoigne & Turner 2004; Adam et al. 2005; Goodhart 2005).  Other 
researchers have exploited the availability of MPC voting records to investigate monetary 
policy-making behaviour within the committee.  Some papers concentrate on the voting 
behaviour of groups of members, particularly internals versus externals.  Spencer (2007) and 
Harris and Spencer (2007) find that external members are more likely to vote for a cut in 
interest rates than internal members.  Gerlach-Kristen (2007) draws similar conclusions from 
an analysis of the relative voting behaviour of insiders and outsiders.  In a slight modification 
of this result, Hansen and McMahon (2008) find evidence that, after their first year on the 
committee, external members tend to vote for lower interest rates than internal members. 
In contrast to these studies, we analyse voting behaviour on the MPC at the individual 
rather than group level.  This approach reduces the risk of confounding individual-level with 
group-level explanatory variables.  To elaborate, the result that external members on average 
vote for lower rates than internal members might be caused by idiosyncratic factors rather 
than anything systematically related to being an external member.  Of course, if this result 
were obtained from analysis of a time period that included the terms of a large number of 
external and internal members, then we could be reasonably confident in attributing 
preferences for lower rates to the external-ness of a member.  However, as the time period 
shrinks to include fewer numbers of individuals within each group, this confidence is reduced.  
Since the MPC has only been in existence since 1997, as of April 2008 any study can 
compare the votes of a maximum of only eleven internal and fourteen external members.  
Given this relatively small number of members within each group, we prefer to look at 
individual-level voting behaviour and assess patterns in group behaviour based upon our 
measures of individual-level behaviour. 
 8 
Other studies of MPC voting records have also sought to measure differences in voting 
behaviour at the individual level.  For example, Besley et al. (2008) estimate a reaction 
function for the preferred interest rate of each MPC member at each MPC meeting between 
June 1997 and July 2007. They find evidence of heterogeneity in reaction functions across 
individual members, but show that this heterogeneity does not appear to be systematically 
related to career background or to the internal or external status of a member.  Brooks et al. 
(2007) find evidence for significant differences in reactions to economic conditions across 
individual members.  Finally, Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005) find that individuals place more 
weight on personal economic forecasts (and thus increasingly differ in preferred interest rates) 
as Bank forecasts become more uncertain.  In addition to these studies of the Bank of 
England, Chappell et al. (2005) estimate individual American Federal Open Market 
Committee member heterogeneity and investigate political influences on monetary policy via 
the Federal Reserve appointment process. 
We depart from these latter studies by analysing member-specific voting behaviour on 
the MPC within a spatial voting framework.
4
  As explained in more detail in the next section, 
we operationalise the spatial voting theory with an item response model and estimate the 
revealed relative monetary policy preferences of MPC members using Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) methods.  This approach allows us to make two key contributions to the 
literature on the MPC.  First, we provide a new measure of the relative voting behaviour of 
the 25 individuals who have sat on the committee between 1997 and May 2008.  Second, 
because the MCMC method we use estimates the posterior distribution of all parameters in 
the statistical model, it is straightforward to make inferences about any auxiliary or composite 
quantity of interest within the model (Clinton et al. 2004).   
                                                     
4
 Chang (2005) has analysed voting on the U.S Federal Open Market Committee within the spatial voting 
framework.  However, her empirical analysis treats all votes to decrease interest rates and all votes to maintain 
interest rates as substantively the same, thereby losing valuable information. 
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This latter feature allows us to draw inferences regarding the differences between new 
MPC appointees and their predecessors, as well as changes in the median monetary policy 
preference on the MPC over time.  As a result, we are able to investigate whether the Labour 
government was able to use its MPC appointment powers to influence monetary policy and, if 
this was the case, what may have been its incentives in doing so.  This is an important issue 
since, as Mueller notes: ‘if the government cannot commit itself not to meddle with the 
macropolicy in general, how can it credibly commit itself not to meddle with the central 
bank?’ (Mueller 2003:465).  Evidence of political patterns in central bank appointments has 
been reported in studies of the US Federal Reserve (Chang 2003).  We demonstrate how our 
preference estimates enable tests for such political patterns in the UK context.  These 
estimates also provide political scientists with the opportunity empirically to assess more 
general theories of appointments to independent policy-making bodies in the context of 
central bank committees. 
 
Measuring the monetary policy preferences of MPC members 
Our dataset consists of the voting choices of sitting MPC members in all 95 non-unanimous 
votes taken on interest rates between June 1997 and April 2008.5  In total we observe the 
voting decisions of 25 MPC members over the period analysed.  The data were coded from an 
MPC voting spreadsheet maintained by the Bank of England.
6
  Each observed pairwise vote 
choice yit, by individual i at meeting t, was coded as 0 if it was cast in favour of the lower 
nominal interest rate alternative and 1 if it was cast in favour of the higher nominal interest 
rate alternative.
7
 
                                                     
5
 Although there are 132 meetings in this time-period, observations from 37 meetings where voting was 
unanimous were dropped.  These unanimous votes do not provide any information about relative differences 
between committee members on the underlying dove-hawk dimension.  
6
 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/index.htm. 
7
 If votes at an MPC meeting were split three ways, where some members dissent in favour of higher interest 
rates than the majority position while other members dissent in favour of lower interest rates than the majority, 
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The starting point for our analysis of these data is the standard spatial model of voting 
(for example,  Hinich and Munger 1997).  Our model assumes that monetary policy 
alternatives can be placed according to some underlying dimension, that MPC members have 
preferences over the location of policies on this dimension, and that each member maximises 
her utility by voting for the alternative closest to her most preferred location on the dimension 
(her ideal point).   
At each meeting MPC members vote to set a nominal interest rate, the Bank rate.  
However, the same nominal interest rate of, say, 4 per cent, could be considered relatively 
restrictive if inflation and output growth were low, but relatively stimulatory if inflation and 
output growth were high.  Therefore, through their choice of a nominal interest rate in a given 
meeting, we model policymakers as choosing a point on an underlying dimension that 
measures the relative restrictiveness of a nominal interest rate given economic conditions.  
We call this the ‘dove-hawk’ dimension.8     
Formally, let the location of a nominal interest rate proposal on the dove-hawk 
dimension be a function f(rt, xt), where rt denotes the nominal level of the proposed interest 
rate and xt is a vector characterising contemporaneous economic conditions at meeting t.  
Although we leave the exact functional form of f(.) unspecified, it is reasonable to assume that 
f(rt, xt) is increasing in rt .  That is, if rt
l
 and rt
h
 are two nominal interest rates evaluated at the 
same meeting, where rt
l
 is the lower of the two nominal rates (rt
l
 < rt
h
), then we assume that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
we coded the decision as two separate pairwise votes: one the majority-preferred interest rate against the lower 
rate alternative, and the other the majority-preferred nominal interest rate against the higher rate alternative.  We 
assume that somebody who supports lower interest rates than the majority in the former vote opposes higher 
interest rates than the majority in the latter vote.  Our coding scheme thus implies that MPC members state their 
preferred interest rate truthfully.  Overall, there were five MPC meetings in the time-period covered where 
members voted for three different interest rates; hence T = 95 pairwise votes from 90 MPC meetings. 
 
8
 Initial investigation of the MPC voting data suggests that the pattern of voting is overwhelmingly one 
dimensional.  That is, members who tend to disagree with the majority tend to disagree in favour of a lower 
interest rate or tend to disagree in favour of a higher interest rate.  The only exception to this one-dimensional 
structure is the behaviour of Willem Buiter, who occasionally disagreed with the majority on the level of interest 
rate activism (in other words, Buiter is observed to vote on some occasion for greater rate increases than the 
majority and on other occasions for greater rate decreases than the majority). 
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the higher nominal rate will always be a more restrictive policy than the proposal for the 
lower rate, and would thus be located higher on the dove-hawk dimension.  Letting lt = f(rt
l
, 
xt) and ht = f(rt
h
, xt) denote the mapping of the lower nominal rate and higher nominal rate 
respectively onto the dove-hawk dimension, we thus assume that lt < ht.  However, as 
economic conditions vary between meetings, the same nominal interest rate level would be 
mapped to different locations on the dove-hawk dimension at different times. 
Our goal is to use observed voting behaviour to make inferences about the systematic 
differences in the preferred points of MPC members on this underlying dimension.  That is, 
we measure whether some members tend to prefer more restrictive interest rates relative to 
other members, across meetings which take place in different economic circumstances.   
There are several possible reasons why members might disagree about the desired 
interest rate given a common set of economic circumstances.  For example, members may 
have different perceptions about the level of potential output in the British economy (Gerlach-
Kristen 2006; Blinder 2007).  The size of the output gap is generally considered to be a key 
driver of future inflation, so if members differ in their assessment of potential output, and 
these differences are reasonably stable over time, then members are likely to exhibit 
differences in preferred interest rates across meetings.  Alternatively, heterogeneity in 
underlying monetary policy preferences may reflect systematic differences in the way in 
which individual members believe economic variables interact to produce inflation.  Hansen 
and McMahon (2008: 5) describe these as differences in the ‘philosophy’ of members, while 
Blinder (2007: 109) labels them ‘differences in decision-making heuristics’.  Finally, 
members may also have differing preferences regarding the short-run trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment, perhaps reflecting ‘personal judgements about the relative social 
costs of inflation versus unemployment’ (Blinder, 2007: 108).9   
                                                     
9
 King (2002: 222) has argued that all MPC members have a responsibility to meet the same inflation target, so 
that there is no room for differences in preferred inflation levels.  However, Blinder (2007: 110) states that in his 
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We are agnostic about the precise reasons why certain MPC members might tend to 
prefer higher interest rates than other members across different meetings.  It is sufficient for 
us to assume that MPC members can be conceptualised as having reasonably stable 
underlying monetary policy preferences, such that a member with more hawkish policy 
preferences will tend to prefer more restrictive interest rates relative to others.   
Specifically, we model an individual MPC member as an actor who chooses between 
proposals for the nominal interest rate according to the relative distance between the location 
of these proposals on the dove-hawk dimension and his or her preferred point on this 
dimension.  In a given MPC meeting at time t, committee member i evaluates the utility he or 
she would derive from two proposed nominal interest rates rt
l
 and rt
h
, where rt
l
 < rt
h
, as 
follows: 
 Ui(rt
l
) = - (θi -  f(rt
l
, xt))
2
 + ηi,t = - (θi -  lt)
2
 + ηi,t   (1) 
 Ui(rt
h
) = - (θi - f(rt
h
, xt))
2
 + νi,t = - (θi - ht)
2
 + νi,t   (2) 
where ηi,t and νi,t are random independently distributed utility shocks with zero mean.
10
  The θi 
parameter in equations (1) and (2) measure member i’s time-invariant preferred point on the 
dove-hawk dimension.  In other words, θi represents the underlying monetary policy 
preference of individual i. 
We follow Clinton et al. (2004) in deriving an item response specification, originally 
developed for education testing, to formalise the spatial model of voting.  First, given the 
utility functions laid out in equations 1 and 2, we can write member i’s utility differential for 
two proposed interest rates at locations lt = f(rt
l
, xt) and ht = f(rt
h
, xt) on the dove-hawk 
dimension as 
 yi,t
*
 = Ui(ht) - Ui(lt) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
experience as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, such differences are ‘common in 
practice’. 
 
10
 See Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006) for an attempt to model the voting of a subset of five MPC members while 
relaxing the independence assumption. 
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 = [- (θi - ht)
2
 + νi,t] – [- (θi -  lt)
2
 + ηi,t]  
 = βt θi – αt + (νi,t - ηi,t)      (3) 
where βt = 2(ht - lt) and αt = (ht
2
 - lt
2
).  Recall that ht denotes the more hawkish interest rate 
proposal.  Individual i votes for the more hawkish proposal located at ht if yi,t
*
 > 0, for the 
more dovish proposal at lt if yi,t
*
 < 0, and is indifferent between the two proposals if yi,t
*
 = 0.   
If we assume that the random variable (νi,t - ηi,t) has a logistic distribution and is 
independent across MPC members and meetings, then we can express the probability of 
individual i voting for the more hawkish of the two interest rates proposed at time t as 
  Pr(yi,t = 1) = 1/(1 + exp(αt – βt θi)).     (4) 
This is essentially a binary logistic regression to be estimated based on the observed binary 
vote choices, yi,t, of members over pairs of interest rate proposals. 
Interpreting the proposal-related parameters in (4) substantively, βt is commonly called 
the ‘item discrimination parameter’, and measures the extent to which the two members’ 
preferences over the dove-hawk dimension determine their choice over two competing 
interest rate proposals observed at time t.  For example, if βt = 0 then the two competing 
interest rate proposals are at identical positions on this dimension and different voting 
behaviour between members does not reflect considerations captured by the dove-hawk 
dimension.  αt is the ‘difficulty parameter’, measuring the general probability of voting for the 
more hawkish interest rate proposed at time t.  In a one-dimensional policy space, the ratio 
αt/βt is equal to the midpoint between the two interest rate proposals on the dove-hawk 
dimension (Jackman 2000a).  Holding member i’s monetary policy preference constant at θi, 
as αt/βt increases then the midpoint becomes more hawkish and the probability that i votes for 
the more hawkish proposal decreases.  Conversely, holding constant αt/βt (that is, for a given 
pairwise vote over interest rate proposals) if member i has an ideal point that is higher than 
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that of member j (i.e. θi > θj) then i is more likely to vote for the more hawkish proposal than 
is j.    
Note that by the derivation above, for a given pairwise vote, the parameters αt and βt 
are functions both of the nominal interest rate alternatives being voted upon at t and 
contemporaneous economic conditions at t.  In this sense, the inclusion of these parameters, 
which are estimated (along with the θi) based on observed voting patterns on the MPC and 
can be thought of as random effects for each specific pairwise vote, allows us to control for 
time-varying economic conditions.  That is, by allowing the αt and βt parameters to vary 
across time-periods we tap variance in the level of nominal interest rate proposals over time 
and variance in economic conditions over time.  An alternative approach might be to model 
the proposal-related parameters for each pairwise vote as a function of observed economic 
indicators.  However, since our primary focus is on the preference estimates θi, we leave the 
inclusion of such variables for future research. 
Model (4) is estimated using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm.
11
  For 
the purposes of estimation, the model specified in (4) was identified by constraining the 
discrimination parameters βt to be positive for every observed vote.  This implies that the 
probability of observing yi,t = 1 is always increasing in θi.  Such a constraint is desirable in the 
monetary policy-setting case because a vote for the more restrictive interest rate proposal in 
any pairwise vote is clearly a more ‘hawkish’ vote and is always coded as 1 in the data.  Thus 
we include information as to the directionality of each voting alternative (that is, which 
                                                     
11
 We estimated the posterior distribution of the parameters in 4 using the MCMCirtKd function from the 
MCMCpack library in R (Martin & Quinn 2006).  The MCMC algorithm iteratively updates the estimates of the 
model parameters.  After a sufficient number of iterations (or burnin period), each set of parameter estimates for 
each given iteration represents a draw from the joint posterior distribution.  This posterior distribution 
‘summarizes our information about the parameters having observed the [voting] data’ (Clinton et al. 2004: 357).  
Given the large number of iterations for which MCMC algorithms are generally run, the estimates from a smaller 
subset of these iterations are stored and utilised for inference (for more technical details see Jackman 2000a,b).  
The MCMC algorithm ran for 1,000,000 iterations, with the first 500,000 iterations discarded as burnin.  Every 
50
th
 iteration after this burnin period was stored for inference.  Therefore, the results presented below are based 
upon 10,000 draws from the posterior distribution.  Standard tests show no indication of non-convergence of the 
parameter estimates (Jackman 2000b; Gelman et al. 2003). 
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alternative is the more restrictive, or hawkish, of the two) in model estimation.  This is 
unusual in applications of ideal point estimation which have generally focused on legislatures 
and the U.S. Supreme Court, since in these settings coding the substantive direction of voting 
alternatives on various issues is more difficult (Bafumi et al. 2005).  Specifically, each βt is 
assigned a prior distribution βt  ~ N(1,10) truncated to lie above zero.  Aside from the 
positivity constraint this prior distribution is relatively uninformative, in the sense that the 
relative differences in MPC member preferences estimates are robust to alternative 
specifications of the priors.  The truncation ensures that the direction of the model is 
identified. Aside from the discrimination parameter, we select standard normal priors θi ~ 
N(0,1) for all ideal point parameters and vague priors αt ~ N(0,10) for the discrimination 
parameters.  Again, the relative differences in MPC member preferences estimates are not 
sensitive to alternative specifications of these priors. 
 
Estimates of MPC member monetary policy preferences 
Our ideal point estimates for the MPC members are summarised in Figure 1.  Each point 
indicates the median estimate of the ideal point of each individual, while the thick line 
indicates the 50 per cent credibility interval of the distribution and the thin line indicates the 
95 per cent credibility interval.   
Inspection of Figure 1 suggests three distinct groups of MPC members: the doves, 
centrists, and hawks.  First, Wadhwani, Blanchflower, Julius and Allsopp are the doves.  All 
four of these members have estimated monetary policy preferences that are clearly 
statistically distinguishable in the dovish direction from at least 18 other MPC members, in 
that none of the former has a 95 per cent credibility interval that overlaps with any of the 
latter.  Second, Large, Besley and Sentence are the hawks.  All have estimated monetary 
policy preferences that are statistically distinguishable in the hawkish direction from 14 other 
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members if we consider 95 per cent credibility intervals, and all 22 other members if we 
consider 50 per cent central tendencies.  The remaining 18 MPC members are the centrists, as 
their monetary policy preferences are indistinguishable from each other if we consider 95 per 
cent credibility intervals.  Davies’s ideal point is estimated with large uncertainty because he 
only voted in two MPC meetings.   
[Figure 1 About Here] 
Figure 1 also reveals that, aside from Large, internal members tend to be located in the 
centrist group.  Interestingly though, externally appointed members are found in both the 
group of hawks, the doves and amongst the centrist group.  Thus our results, which are based 
upon an analysis of individual-level voting behaviour, do not entirely agree with the previous 
research that concluded that external members tend to vote for less restrictive interest rates 
than internal members (for example, Spencer 2007; Harris & Spencer 2007; Gerlach-Kristin 
2007). 
Given that each committee member’s estimated ideal point is associated with varying 
degrees of uncertainty, it is useful also to compare members according to their probable 
ranking on a dove-hawk scale.  For each of the 10,000 samples from the posterior distribution, 
we ranked the sampled ideal point of each of the twenty-five individuals on a dove-hawk 
scale and stored the resulting ranking.  Table 2 summarises the distribution of rankings across 
these samples.  A rank of one indicates that the individual was ranked as the most dovish of 
the 25 members, while a rank of 25 indicates that he or she was ranked the most hawkish. 
[Table 2 About Here] 
The results in Table 2 support the idea that there have been three distinct groups of 
MPC members since 1997.  Regarding the doves, Allsopp, Julius, Wadhwani, and 
Blanchflower were all ranked 5 or lower (that is, as one of the five most dovish members) in 
at least 95 per cent of samples.  Regarding the hawks, Large, Besley and Sentence were 
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ranked 21 or higher (that is, as one of the four most hawkish members) in at least 95 per cent 
of the samples.  Overall, then, these results corroborate our interpretation of Figure 1.  It is 
also worth noting that we can be confident that the present Governor, Mervyn King, is among 
the more hawkish of the remaining centrists, since he is ranked between 16 and 21 at least 95 
per cent of the time. 
As a validity check, we compare our ideal point estimates with two alternative ways of 
measuring the preferences of the MPC members that are commonly used by the media and 
MPC-watchers.  The first is a simple ‘batting average’ score, where members are ranked 
according to the proportion of times they voted for an increase in interest rates.  The second is 
a measure that is commonly used by The Financial Times (FT) and other publications (for 
example, Edmunds 1999).  This measure is calculated by assigning scores for each vote of 
each member, where a member scores 1 if he or she voted with the majority, 2 if he or she 
voted for a higher interest rate than the majority and 0 if he or she voted for a lower interest 
rate than the majority.  An average of these scores is then calculated for each member across 
all of his or her votes. 
The estimates from our Bayesian ideal point model compared to these ‘batting 
average’ and ‘Financial Times’ scores are illustrated in Figure 2.  The first thing to note is the 
relatively high correlation between our estimates and both these types of measures – as shown 
by the clustering of most of the MPC members along the two regression lines.  In other 
words, our method clearly passes the concurrent validity test. 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
The figure nevertheless highlights some important differences between our estimates 
and the two more commonly used methods.  The batting average method does not take 
account of the economic conditions at the time of each vote.  For example, if a large portion 
of a member’s time on the committee happens to coincide with a period when economic 
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circumstance dictates that the Bank cut interest rates, he or she will tend to be artificially 
located towards the dovish end of the scale.  This is the case with both Allsopp and Bean, who 
we locate in much less extreme (albeit still relatively dovish in the case of Allsopp) positions 
than does the batting average measure.   
The FT method improves on the batting average method because it measures whether 
each vote is part of the majority or the minority.  To the extent that the majority view on the 
MPC tends to reflect economic conditions, it provides some sort of control for economic 
conditions: that is, a dissent vote implies that an individual prefers lower or higher rates 
relative to the majority of members, given economic circumstances.   
But our method improves on the FT measure in this regard also.  For example, our 
method also locates Allsopp in a less extreme position than the FT measure, which locates 
Allsopp as almost as dovish as Wadhwani.  The close proximity of Wadhwani and Allsopp in 
the FT’s scores is due to the fact that, over the course of their respective terms on the MPC, 
they had a similar proportion of dissenting votes in favour of lower rates (13 out of 37 for 
Wadhwani and 11 out of 37 for Allsopp) while neither dissented in favour of higher rates.  
However, these simple summaries, which drive the FT scores, do not reflect the fact that, 
during the period when Wadhwani and Allsopp were simultaneously on the committee 
(between June 2000 and May 2002), Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani on eight 
occasions while Wadhwani never voted for higher rates than Allsopp.  By modelling each 
voting observation directly, rather than averaging over a member’s entire voting history like 
the FT method, our measure picks up the fact that, given the same economic circumstances in 
the same meetings, Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani eight times. 
Finally, neither the batting average nor the FT method provides uncertainty estimates 
surrounding MPC member preference estimates.  This may invite the observer to conclude 
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that any two individuals differ in their preferences when the difference between their 
estimated ideal points may in fact be well within the margin of error given the available data.  
  
Patterns in the composition of the MPC 
With these estimates of the relative location of MPC members’ monetary policy preferences 
we can investigate patterns over time in the composition of the committee in terms of 
preferences.  We test whether these patterns are consistent with an electorally driven cycle in 
appointments.  
 
 Is there an electoral cycle in appointments to the Bank of England MPC? 
The classic ‘political business cycle’ (PBC) theory predicts that incumbent governments seek 
to engineer economic booms prior to elections, then implement restrictive policies after 
elections in  order to deal with the inflationary consequences (Nordhaus 1975). In the present 
context, this would imply that the British Chancellor would have wanted to use his 
appointment powers to ensure favourable economic conditions prior to general elections.  
That is, the Chancellor would be expected to use appointments to bias the MPC in a dovish 
direction in a pre-election period so that a comparatively easier monetary policy would 
stimulate (or at least not restrict) the economy in the run-up to the election.  Given that it is 
generally thought that monetary policy affects output with a six to nine month lag (Clarida et 
al. 1999: 1685), and that appointment opportunities are relatively rare because of fixed MPC 
terms, it appears reasonable to focus on the period between 24 and 6 months prior to a general 
election as the ‘pre-election period’.  In the remaining ‘non-election periods’, without 
pressing electoral incentives, the Chancellor would be expected to seek a more balanced, 
centrist MPC to deal more rigorously with the inflationary consequences of any pre-election 
stimulus. 
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It should be noted that the Chancellor could not possibly have perfect information 
about the likely behaviour of each member he appointed to the MPC.  This may have limited 
his ability to appoint the ‘types’ of central banker he wanted given the political and economic 
circumstances.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Chancellor had some idea 
about the preferences of potential appointees.  These beliefs, based upon past academic work 
by the individuals, their career backgrounds and also information gathered via mutual 
acquaintances, can be thought of as a probability distribution along the dove-hawk scale for 
each appointee, some relatively wide (indicating high uncertainty regarding preferences), 
some narrower (indicating less uncertainty regarding preferences).  Of course, the Chancellor 
would also have been able to observe the voting behaviour of existing MPC members and use 
this information when deciding whether to re-appoint someone. 
In order to investigate whether there are electorally driven patterns in MPC 
appointments, we first examine the outcome of each instance where a new committee member 
was appointed to replace an existing member.  Each ‘appointment episode’ is measured in 
terms of the probability that a new member of the committee is more dovish than his or her 
predecessor was.
12
  A probability of 0.5 indicates that a new member is estimated to have an 
equal probability of being more dovish than was his or her predecessor and being more 
hawkish than was his or her predecessor.  A higher (lower) score indicates a higher (lower) 
probability of an appointee being more dovish than was his or her predecessor.  These scores 
are presented in Table 3.
13
   
[Table 3 About Here] 
                                                     
12
 Each probability is based upon the 10,000 draws from the joint posterior distribution and corresponds the 
frequency with which the appointee in question is drawn as being more dovish than his or her predecessor.   
 
13  The table does not include those individuals who were original members of the MPC in June 1997 (George, 
King, Buiter, Goodhart, Plenderleith and Davies), or who were appointed in the months thereafter to fill hitherto 
empty positions on the committee (Julius, Budd and Vickers). 
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The appointment data in Table 3 can be interpreted in terms of four key periods.   
First, consistent with a PBC pattern in MPC appointments, during the pre-2001 election 
period (June 1999 to January 2001) new appointees tended to be more dovish than the 
members they replaced.  This trend is particularly pronounced in the cases of Wadhwani’s and 
Allsopp’s appointments.  Wadhwani replaced the relatively hawkish Budd, who had only 
served on the committee for a shortened two-year term, in June 1999, two years before the 
general election.  According to our ideal point estimates the probability that Wadhwani is 
more dovish than Budd is greater than 0.99.  At the same time, the Chancellor opted to re-
appoint the executive director, Plenderleith, who appears to be relatively dovish compared to 
Budd.   
Allsopp replaced Goodhart in June 2000, eleven months before the general election.  
Interestingly, Goodhart, relatively centrist on our dove-hawk scale, stated publicly that he had 
expressed an interest in serving a second term (Beattie 2000).  Despite this, the Chancellor 
chose to replace him with Allsopp who again has an estimated probability of being more 
dovish than Goodhart that is greater than 0.99.  Furthermore, most economic journalists at the 
time of Allsopp’s appointment expected him to be a dove (Thornton 2000).  The Chancellor is 
likely to have been aware of these expectations. 
Furthermore, in addition to these stand-out cases, every replacement during the pre-
election period for the 2001 general elections involved the appointment of an individual who 
has an estimated probability greater than 0.99 of being more dovish than his or her 
predecessor.  The result of this appointment policy was that, from October 2000 until the 
general election in May 2001, the MPC contained three of the four individuals identified 
above as the clearest doves out of all MPC members since 1997: Allsopp, Wadhwani and 
Julius.  In sum, the pattern of appointments in the pre-2001 election period is consistent with 
the predictions of the PBC theory. 
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Second, and again consistent with the PBC predictions, during the subsequent non-
election period (February 2001 to May 2003) MPC appointments reduced the dovish bias on 
the MPC.  In this period, appointments resulted in either (1) the replacement of dovish or 
centrist MPC members with centrist individuals, or (2) the replacement of centrist MPC 
members with more hawkish individuals.  The appointments of Barker, Tucker and Bell fall 
into the first category, while that of Large falls into the second.  That is, although the 
estimated probability of Barker, Tucker and Bell being more dovish than their predecessors is 
lower than 0.01, lower than 0.01 and 0.04 respectively, all are far from being hawks according 
to our ideal point estimates in Figure 1.  In contrast, the probability that Large is more dovish 
than his predecessor, Clementi, is lower than 0.01. We have already identified Large as one of 
the clear hawks according to Figure 1. 
Third, however, the observed pattern in appointments during the pre-2005 election 
period (June 2003 to December 2004) runs contrary to PBC expectations that the Chancellor 
would use appointments to induce a dovish bias on the MPC in the run-up to an election. 
During this period appointments made only a marginal difference to the overall balance 
between doves and hawks on the MPC.  For example, Lambert, appointed in June 2003, has 
estimated probability lower than 0.01 of being more dovish than his predecessor Allsopp, but 
is still only a centrist according to Figure 1.  In addition, according to our estimates, the 
probability that Lomax was more dovish than George, whom she replaced
14
 in July 2003, is 
only 0.43.  The policy of making a mixture of both dovish and hawkish replacements 
continued during the final non-election period in our data (January 2005 to April 2008). 
Another way of assessing whether there is a PBC pattern in MPC appointments is to 
look at how appointments shift the location of the median member of the committee.  Given 
that the MPC is a collective choice body that make decisions by majority vote, the Chancellor 
                                                     
14
 While Mervyn King replaced Sir Eddie George as the Governor of the Bank when Sir Eddie George’s term 
ended, it was Rachel Lomax who filled the resulting vacancy on the MPC. 
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is able to influence monetary policy via appointments only to the extent that he or she can 
move the position of the median voter on the committee (cf. Krehbiel 2007).  In line with the 
PBC predictions, we inspect the estimated change in the MPC median between key points in 
the electoral cycle: namely, the last month of a ‘non-election period’ and last month of the 
subsequent ‘pre-election period’, and vice versa.15  Figure 4 plots the median estimate of these 
changes, together with 95 per cent credibility intervals.
16
 
[Figure 3 About Here] 
As with our analysis of individual appointment episodes, observed changes in the 
position of the MPC median are consistent with the PBC predictions in the pre-2001 election 
period but not in the pre-2005 election period.  Figure 4 shows that, between the end of the 
first non-election period and the end of the pre-election period for the 2001 general elections 
(from June 1999 to January 2001), the estimated shift in the MPC median is negative and is 
statistically distinguishable from zero.  In addition, between the end of the pre-2001 election 
period and end of the subsequent non-election period (January 2001 to May 2003), the 
estimated change in the MPC median is positive and marginally indistinguishable from zero 
at the 95 per cent level.  This is consistent with the PBC prediction that the Chancellor would 
seek to re-balance the MPC post-election after inducing a dovish bias in the pre-2001 election 
period.   However, between the end of this non-election period and the end of the subsequent 
pre-2005 election period, where the PBC would predict a dovish change in the MPC median, 
the estimated change in fact tends to be positive, though clearly indistinguishable from zero at 
the 95 per cent level (May 2003 to December 2004). 
                                                     
15
 These estimates are again based on draws from the posterior distribution.  For each draw, the median ideal 
point of each combination of members that have sat on the MPC together at any point in time was calculated.  To 
obtain a draw of the change in the median between two time points we then took the difference between the 
median of the committee composition at the first time point and the median of the committee composition at the 
second time point.  This exercise was repeated 10,000 times, yielding a sample from the posterior distribution of 
the change in the median MPC member at each time interval of interest. 
 
16
 The final non-election period is defined using the last month of observed voting data, and would correspond to 
a general election in April 2010. 
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In sum, our analysis of individual appointments and of changes in the median does not 
appear to support the contention that there was a straightforward PBC-type electoral cycle in 
appointments to the Bank of England MPC.  Though in the pre-2001 electoral period the 
Chancellor did tend to appoint relative doves to replace more hawkish predecessors on the 
MPC, and in doing this successfully shifted the MPC median in a dovish direction, no such 
pattern is apparent in the pre-2005 election period.  These results are consistent with existing 
research that has found only weak support for political business cycles in the UK (for 
example, Alesina et al. 1997). 
 
Discussion 
Despite the lack of evidence for a straightforward electoral cycle in MPC appointments, it 
does appear that the British Chancellor is able to move the position of the median voter of the 
MPC through his or her appointment powers.  Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, we estimate that 
there was a clear dovish shift in the MPC median between and June 1999 and January 2001, 
and that there was hawkish shift in the MPC median, marginally distinguishable from zero, in 
two later periods.  This suggests that appointments to the MPC matter for monetary policy. 
 As a result, it is important to develop a better understanding of the likely incentives of 
the Government with regard to MPC appointments.  We have demonstrated that there is weak 
support for a straightforward electoral cycle in appointments.  But given that monetary policy 
is one of the most powerful tools of macroeconomic management at a state’s disposal, it is 
likely that politicians will have some interests regarding the composition of the body that sets 
this policy.   
One potentially fruitful avenue for future research would be to analyse the 
Chancellor’s monetary policy (and thus MPC appointment) incentives conditional on fiscal 
policy.  Political economists have analysed the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in the 
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context of varying levels of central bank independence (Alesina & Tabellini 1987; Agell et al. 
1996; Clark & Hallerberg 2000).  However, the British Labour government operated in a 
context of varying levels of constraints on fiscal policy.  Specifically, in order to demonstrate 
that Labour could be responsible with the public finances, during the 1997 general election 
campaign the party leadership pledged that for its first two years in office Labour would stick 
to the public spending plans of the previous Conservative government.  This pledge 
committed the new Labour government to a relatively austere fiscal policy for at least two 
years.  For example, in the financial year 1999-2000 public expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP reached its lowest point since 1980 (HM Treasury 2007).  During the financial year 
2000-01 public expenditure began to rise, but only slowly.  Moreover, the government 
continued to record a positive budget surplus until the end of the financial year 2001-02.   
Thus, there were political constraints upon fiscal policy in the period prior to the May 
2001 general election.  Given these constraints, the Chancellor may have had an incentive to 
ensure that a relatively dovish MPC maintained economic growth in the run-up to this 
election. 
In contrast, from the financial year 2001-02 until the present, government expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP has increased rapidly, while the cyclically adjusted budget balance 
has been in deficit since 2002-2003 (HM Treasury 2007).  Having gained a reasonable 
reputation for economic competence, Labour did not need to make similar restrictive fiscal 
policy pledges prior to the 2001 general election.  In a context where increased public 
investment was likely to fuel continued economic growth, and was indeed electorally popular 
in itself, the Chancellor may have had an incentive to ensure a more centrist or hawkish MPC 
in order to minimise the inflationary consequences of fiscal expansion. 
To explore the relationship between MPC appointments and fiscal policy, Figure 4 
plots the location of the estimated median preference on the committee for each meeting 
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between June 1997 and April 2008, together with time series of the budget balance and public 
spending over this period. 
 [Figure 4 About Here] 
Figure 4 raises the possibility that MPC appointments may be related to the stance of fiscal 
policy.  Consistent with the evidence presented earlier, the plots in Figure 4 suggest that the 
MPC median became markedly more dovish in the two years prior to the May 2001 general 
election and then reverted back to a relatively more hawkish trend, which persisted during the 
pre-2005 election period and thereafter.  We see that when the budget surplus is at its highest 
we also measure the most dovish MPC median for the entire 1997-2008 period.  As the 
budget surplus moves toward a deficit hawks and centrists start to replace doves in the 
committee and the estimated MPC median becomes more centrist.    
This observed pattern is only suggestive, but raises the possibility that the Chancellor 
used MPC appointments to pursue a less constrained monetary policy during a pre-election 
period when public spending was constrained (prior to the 2001 general election), and then to 
pursue a more centrist or hawkish monetary policy after the initial spending constraints had 
been lifted (after Labour’s re-election in 2001).  Given the evidence that MPC appointments 
matter – in the sense that they have enabled the Chancellor to move the median – and the 
inadequacy of a straightforward PBC-type explanation for appointment patterns, the 
possibility of an interaction between the Chancellor’s fiscal policy and MPC appointment 
incentives at least merits further investigation.  We leave this to future research. 
 
Conclusion 
We have examined the making of monetary policy in the UK in the first ten years of the 
independence of the Bank of England.  We employed a Bayesian estimation technique to 
undertake a spatial analysis of voting on the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee 
 27 
between June 1997 and April 2008.  To our knowledge, this is the first time such a statistical 
estimation technique has been applied to voting in a central bank committee and is also the 
first spatial analysis of voting in the Bank of England MPC.  Using this method we produced 
an original set of estimates of the ideal points of MPC members on a ‘dove-hawk’ scale 
representing relative preferences over interest rates given economic conditions.   
These estimates constitute a valuable contribution to the literature on the MPC, 
independent central banks, and on appointments to independent policy-making committees in 
general.  They provide new and substantively motivated measures of the relative monetary 
policy preferences of individual MPC members together with easily interpretable uncertainty 
estimates for these measures.  In addition, because we use Bayesian simulation to produce our 
estimates it is straightforward to make inferences about auxiliary or composite quantities of 
interest, such as the position of the median voter on the MPC. 
We illustrated the practical value of our dove-hawk measures by using them to 
investigate the British Chancellor’s appointments to the MPC.  The observed pattern in MPC 
appointments, and in the movement of the median voter on the MPC over time, is not 
consistent with a political business cycle approach where the Chancellor seeks a more dovish 
MPC composition in the run-up to general elections.  Although MPC appointments did lead to 
a clear dovish shift in the MPC median in the period prior to the 2001 general election, this 
was not the case in the period prior to the 2005 general election.   
Nevertheless, our analysis indicates that MPC appointments do matter for monetary 
policy, in that the Chancellor has been able to move the MPC median through appointments.  
This finding has implications for research on independent central banks more generally, in 
that it suggests that politicians may still attempt to influence the monetary policy of a 
formally independent central bank via appointments.  Some may argue that a degree of 
democratic control upon such a major macroeconomic policy tool is desirable, while others 
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may argue the opposite.  Either way, our results highlight the importance of appointments as a 
channel for political influence. Given the inadequacy of the straightforward political business 
cycle approach to explaining appointments, we have suggested that future research may 
usefully investigate the relationship between the Chancellor’s appointment incentives and the 
current stance of fiscal policy. 
The Bayesian item-response model we use to study voting behaviour on the Bank of 
England MPC has already been demonstrated to be useful for studying voting in other 
committees such as courts (see Martin & Quinn 2002) as well as legislatures more generally 
(Clinton et al. 2004).  But this approach is also applicable to other central banks that publish 
individual level voting data.  These include the Federal Reserve, the National Bank Poland, 
the Swedish Riksbank, and the Bank of Japan.  In different central bank settings scholars may 
be able to use preference estimates to test alternative theories of central bank appointments, 
taking advantage of changes in the parties controlling appointing institutions or of variance in 
the political actors responsible for appointing different committee members.  To aid this 
endeavour, in future work we aim to examine extensions of the ideal-point estimation 
framework presented above that may be possible in the context of central bank voting.  Such 
extensions include explicitly incorporating economic information in the statistical model, 
incorporating information regarding the nominal interest rate alternatives being voted upon, 
and experimenting with alternative specifications of the utility function guiding the voting 
behaviour. 
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Table 1 
MPC Members, June 1997-April 2008 
Name First Meeting Last Meeting Status 
Background prior to 
appointment  
Howard Davies June 1997 July 1997 Internal Bank of England 
Willem Buiter June 1997 May 2000 External Academia 
Charles Goodhart June 1997 May 2000 External Academia 
Ian Plenderleith June 1997 May 2002 Internal Bank of England 
Sir Edward George June 1997 June 2003 Internal Bank of England 
Mervyn King June 1997 -- Internal Bank of England/Academia 
DeAnne Julius September 1997 May 2001 External Industry 
David Clementi September 1997 August 2002 Internal Finance 
Sir Alan Budd December 1997 May 1999 External Government 
John Vickers June 1998 September 2000 Internal Academia 
Sushil Wadhwani June 1999 May 2002 External Finance 
Christopher Allsopp June 2000 May 2003 External Academia 
Stephen Nickell June 2000 May 2006 External Academia 
Charles Bean October 2000 -- Internal Academia 
Kate Barker June 2001 -- External Industry 
Paul Tucker June 2002 -- Internal Bank of England 
Marian Bell July 2002 June 2005 External Finance/Government 
Sir Andrew Large October 2002 January 2006 Internal Finance 
Richard Lambert June 2003 March 2006 External Financial journalist 
Rachel Lomax July 2003 -- Internal Government 
David Walton July 2005 June 2006 External Finance 
Sir John Gieve February 2006 -- Internal Government 
David Blanchflower June 2006 -- External Academia 
Tim Besley September 2006 -- External Academia 
Andrew Sentance October 2006 -- External Industry 
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Table 2 
   
Summary of Rankings by iteration  
 
 
MPC Member Rank 5% Rank 25% Median 
rank 
Rank 75% Rank 95% 
Large 21 23 24 25 25 
Besley 21 23 24 25 25 
Sentance 21 23 24 25 25 
Budd 17 20 21 22 24 
Vickers 16 19 21 22 24 
King 16 18 19 20 21 
Walton 9 14 18 20 23 
Tucker 14 16 17 19 21 
Buiter 9 14 17 19 21 
Goodhart 10 14 16 18 20 
Gieve 9 13 16 18 20 
Lambert 7 9 13 15 18 
Lomax 7 9 12 14 17 
George 7 9 11 13 15 
Barker 7 9 11 13 15 
Clementi 7 9 11 13 16 
Bean 7 9 10 12 15 
Plenderleith 7 8 10 12 15 
Davies 3 5 9 19 23 
Nickell 5 5 6 7 7 
Bell 4 5 6 7 8 
Allsopp 3 4 4 4 5 
Julius 1 2 3 3 4 
Wadhwani 1 1 2 2 3 
Blanchflower 1 1 2 3 4 
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Table 3 
 
MPC Replacements 
 
 
New appointee 
 
 
Predecessor 
 
 
Date of replacement 
 
 
Appointment 
type 
 
 
Probability that 
new appointee is 
more dovish than 
his or her 
predecessor 
Clementi Davies September 1997 Internal 0.45 
Wadhwani Budd June 1999 External > 0.99 
Nickell Buiter June 2000 External > 0.99 
Allsopp Goodhart June 2000 External > 0.99 
Bean Vickers October 2000 Internal > 0.99 
Barker Julius May 2001 External < 0.01 
 -------------------- GENERAL ELECTION, June 2001 -------------------- 
Tucker Plenderlieth June 2002 Internal < 0.01 
Bell Wadhwani July 2002 External 0.04 
Large Clementi October 2002 Internal < 0.01 
Lambert Allsopp June 2003 External < 0.01 
Lomax George July 2003 Internal 0.43 
 -------------------- GENERAL ELECTION, May 2005 -------------------- 
Walton Bell July 2005 External 0.01 
Gieve Large February 2006 Internal > 0.99 
Blanchflower Nickell June 2006 External > 0.99 
Besley Lambert September 2006 External < 0.01 
Sentance Walton October 2006 External 0.05 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 Comparison of Bayesian Estimation with Two Alternative Measures 
 
 
 
 
Note: The functions in the figures are bivariate regressions of our Bayesian ideal point estimates on 
the FT score/batting average score for each member. 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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